Democracy and Coercive DiplomacyKenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
Information and signaling in international crises | 23 |
Democratic politics in international crises | 57 |
Domestic competition and signaling in international crises | 84 |
Selective threats effective threats the initiation and escalation of international crises | 119 |
Credibility confirmed the implications of domestic support | 161 |
Credibility undermined the implications of domestic dissent | 197 |
Conclusions and implications | 231 |
Appendices | 247 |
Solution to the basic crisis bargaining game | 249 |
Solution to the crisis bargaining game with opposition | 253 |
Data and methods | 261 |
Coding and sources for opposition stances | 273 |
| 282 | |
| 297 | |
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Common terms and phrases
actors analysis argument assumption asymmetric information audience costs bluff bluffing Britain British Bueno de Mesquita cabinet chal challenge challenger's Chapter coded coefficient Cold War competition concessions confirmatory effect credible crisis bargaining crisis initiation cutpoint decision makers decreases Delcassé democracy democratic governments democratic initiator democratic peace democratic peace theories democratic targets dependent variable deterrence directed dyad dispute dissent domestic opposition domestic political dovish electoral equilibrium escalation estimated evidence ex ante expected value Fashoda Fashoda crisis fixed-effect force foreign policy France French Germany given government and opposition hawkish Hence hypothesis increase informational asymmetries interests international crises leaders less Liberal ment MIDs military action normative observations opposed threats opposition party opposition's payoff percent perspective position predicted preferences probability of resistance regime type Rhineland rival Salisbury Sanderson 1965 signals Soviet Union stance stand firm state's status quo strategy Suez crisis suggests tests theory tion University Press voters