Delegation and Agency in International OrganizationsDarren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson, Michael J. Tierney Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters. |
Contents
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0521862094ptl2_p3940 | 39 |
0521862094c02_p4176 | 41 |
0521862094c03_p77106 | 77 |
0521862094c04_p107139 | 107 |
0521862094c05_p140164 | 140 |
0521862094c06_p165196 | 165 |
0521862094ptl3_p197198 | 197 |
0521862094c09_p255280 | 255 |
0521862094c10_p281311 | 281 |
0521862094c11_p312338 | 312 |
0521862094ptl1_p339340 | 339 |
0521862094c12_p341368 | 341 |
0521862094ref_p369393 | 369 |
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0521862094ser_p12 | 407 |
Other editions - View all
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations Darren G. Hawkins,David A. Lake,Daniel L. Nielson,Michael J. Tierney No preview available - 2006 |
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations Darren G. Hawkins,David A. Lake,Daniel L. Nielson,Michael J. Tierney No preview available - 2006 |
Common terms and phrases
actions actors agency slack agent activity agent autonomy agent strategies agreement alternative argue argument benefits bilateral binding conditions chapter coalition Coeff collective principal Commission Congress contract control mechanisms costs countries decision decision-making delegate authority delegation to IOs dependent variable develop discretion donor economic European Parliament European Union foreign aid Fund conditionality greater IADB ideal point increase independent influence institutions interests International Monetary Fund international organizations issue-areas issues legislators lending Lisa Martin loan Lyne McCubbins MDBs member governments money-center banks monitoring moral hazard multilateral aid multiple principals negotiations Nielson OECD outcomes percent Pollack principal preferences principal-agent principal-agent problem principal’s problems procedures programs proposal re-contracting relationship role SBAs scholars Security Council significant social social lending staff status quo suggests theory Tierney tion treaties United variable volume voters voting rules World Bank
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